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decline is so different. This paper presents a model of urban decline with durable housing and verifies these
implications of the model: (1) city growth rates are skewed so that cities grow more quickly than they decline;
(2) urban decline is highly persistent; (3) positive shocks increase population more than they increase
housing prices; (4) negative shocks decrease housing prices more than they decrease population; (5) if
housing prices are below construction costs, then the city declines; and (6) the combination of cheap housing
and weak labor demand attracts individuals with low levels of human capital to declining cities.
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Urban decline is not the mirror image of growth, and durable housing
is the primary reason the nature of decline is so different. This paper
presents a model of urban decline with durable housing and verifies
these implications of the model: (1) city growth rates are skewed so
that cities grow more quickly than they decline; (2) urban decline is
highly persistent; (3) positive shocks increase population more than
they increase housing prices; (4) negative shocks decrease housing
prices more than they decrease population; (5) if housing prices are
below construction costs, then the city declines; and (6) the combi-
nation of cheap housing and weak labor demand attracts individuals
with low levels of human capital to declining cities.
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I. Introduction
Across space and over time, the population of a city is almost perfectly
correlated with the size of its housing stock. Regressing the logarithm
of the number of housing units on the logarithm of population in any
of the last four census years always yields estimated elasticities and ’s2R
very near one. In every decade since the 1960s, the correlation coeffi-
cient between log changes in housing units and population is above 0.9.
Despite the tight link between the housing sector and population
change, the modern literature on urban dynamics (e.g., Glaeser et al.
1992; Eaton and Eckstein 1997; Black and Henderson 1999) typically
ignores housing and the physical side of cities altogether. An implicit
assumption of this research is that new housing is elastically supplied
and that housing quickly disappears in cities with declining productivity
levels. Even if new housing can be elastically supplied, old housing does
not disappear quickly. Housing may be the quintessential durable good,
since homes often are decades, if not a century, old.
Because homes can be built quickly, but disappear slowly, urban de-
cline is not the mirror image of growth. Understanding the impact of
durable housing is critical to comprehending the urban decline that is
prevalent among many of our larger cities. Eleven of the 15 largest cities
in 1950 lost population over the ensuing 50 years; eight of them—
Baltimore, Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St.
Louis, and Washington, DC—lost population in each decade.
In this paper, we present a simple model of urban decline and durable
housing and test the implications of that model. Figure 1 illustrates our
framework. The housing market is characterized by a kinked supply
curve that is highly elastic when prices are at or above construction costs
and highly inelastic otherwise. Because housing is durable, a negative
demand shock like that drawn from D to D1 leads to a large fall in price
but little change in quantity. Given the extremely tight relationship
between housing units and population, declining cities initially suffer
price declines, not population losses. As long as housing is elastically
supplied, a positive demand shock, shown by the shift from D to D2, will
cause new housing units to be supplied at roughly constant cost so that
there will be an increase in population accompanied by little change
in price.
This asymmetric response to positive and negative demand shocks
that arises from the durable nature of housing is consistent with all the
key stylized facts about urban growth and decline. For example, housing
durability can explain the highly skewed nature of urban growth one
sees in the data, where expansion can be extremely rapid (Las Vegas’s
population grew by 61.6 percent in the 1990s) but decline much less
so (Hartford, CT, had the largest population loss of 13.9 percent
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Fig. 1.—The nature of housing supply and construction costs
among cities with at least 100,000 people at the beginning of the 1990s).
Durable housing largely explains why decline typically is such a lengthy
process. The eight consistently declining cities referenced above remain
large places even after five consecutive decades of population loss.
As figure 1 suggests, a durable housing model predicts that increases
in population will be associated with small increases in prices, but de-
creases in population will be associated with large decreases in prices.
The data support this prediction. Durable housing also suggests that
exogenous forces predicting urban growth will have large effects on
population and small effects on prices. Conversely, exogenous forces
that predict urban decline will have small effects on population and big
effects on prices. Using the weather as a source of exogenous changes
in the attractiveness of cities, we find support for these predictions.
Durability also implies that a negative shock to a city’s productivity
will continue to cause population declines over many subsequent dec-
ades. This is consistent with our results, which show that the degree of
persistence in population change among declining cities is double that
for growing cities. Durability of housing also implies that the distribution
of house prices should predict future growth, and not merely because
high house prices reflect future price appreciation. Population growth
is indeed much lower in cities with larger fractions of their housing
stocks valued below the cost of new construction. This is not a causal
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connection, but it does suggest the role that the housing market plays
in mediating urban growth.
In addition, durable housing helps account for the connection be-
tween urban decline and poverty. The simple correlation between the
family poverty rate in 1999 and population growth in the 1990s for
places with at least 100,000 residents is 0.48. When urban productivity
falls, the most active members of the labor force will naturally flee; but
durable housing ensures that their homes will then be occupied by those
that are less connected to the labor market. As our model suggests, the
correlation between poverty and a decline in population disappears after
one controls for the presence of abundant, cheap housing. This finding
may help us understand why declining cities so often are centers of
social distress.
Section II provides a simple model of urban growth with durable
housing that derives the asymmetry illustrated in figure 1. Section III
takes the various implications of that model to the data, providing the
empirical detail behind the key features of urban decline. Section IV
shows that our “bricks and mortar” perspective on decline is robust to
other possible explanations, including those associated with the pres-
ence of other durable and fixed factors, as well as filtering in the housing
market. A brief summary in Section V concludes the paper.
II. Spatial Equilibrium and a Framework
Rosen (1979) and Roback (1980, 1982) provide the foundation for our
understanding of intercity differences in wages and rents. In their long-
run, equilibrium framework, some individuals are mobile enough to
eliminate utility differences across space. For similar people, this implies
that
wages amenities housing costsp reservation utility. (1)
This “no-arbitrage” relationship defines a spatial equilibrium in which
differences in housing costs across cities must reflect differences in earn-
ings or differences in amenities for a given individual. Using 1980 census
data for illustrative purposes, we estimate a simplified version of the
Rosen-Roback specification in which city-level median house values are
regressed on median family income and the barest of amenity mea-
sures—mean January temperature—for 102 cities with 1980 populations
of at least 150,000:
median house pricep
155,954 (21,623) 4.56 (0.46)#median family income
 1,441 (219)# January temperature, (2)
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where all monetary variables are in 2000 dollars, standard errors are in
parentheses, and the . Figure 2 graphs median house prices2R p 0.60
against the fitted values from this regression. There are many valid
criticisms of this type of regression, and a more thorough analysis would
use exogenous sources of labor demand and allow for individual het-
erogeneity as in Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988) and Gyourko
and Tracy (1991), but the results highlight the empirical power of the
Rosen-Roback equilibrium concept. High housing prices generally are
associated with either high incomes or a more attractive (i.e., warmer)
climate.
But just as figure 2 is consistent with the Rosen-Roback framework,
it also contains the puzzle that motivates our analysis. The dashed hor-
izontal line at $97,794 represents the estimated cost of a modest-quality,
1,200–square foot home in 2000 dollars. (The measurement of con-
struction costs is discussed below in detail.) In at least one-quarter of
the sample, median housing prices are well below this level. For housing
prices to be low enough for people to live in low-wage, low-amenity
places such as Buffalo, Detroit, Philadelphia, and St. Louis, houses in
those cities must sell for much less than they cost to build. Thus the
spatial equilibrium for people cannot be a static equilibrium for the
housing market.
The solution to the puzzle is that places can have housing values
below construction costs because once homes are built, there is no lower
bound on their prices until they fall to zero. The cities of the Rust Belt
once had amenities and wages that justified new construction. They no
longer do, but the cities remain because their homes have lasted. To
understand America’s spatial equilibrium, we must embed the Rosen-
Roback framework in a dynamic setting with durable housing. In doing
so, we draw on a rich literature on durability and urban development;
but we focus on urban decline, whereas previous research overwhelm-
ingly has dealt with urban growth.1
Starting from equation (1) above, we assume that every person who
chooses to live in a given house receives each period a city-specific wage
level W, a city-specific amenity level A, and a location-specific amenity
level a and pays rent r. We assume that everyone is a renter, but equiv-
alently, each resident can be thought of as an owner-occupier if r rep-
resents the user cost of housing. We normalize the reservation utility to
zero and denote , so that free mobility implies . Onv{ W A v ap r
1 The literature is voluminous. Important primary contributions include Arnott (1980),
Brueckner (1980, 1981), Hochman and Pines (1982), Wheaton (1982), and Braid (1988).
See Brueckner (2000) for a recent review. The closest research to ours is that on filtering,
where houses cheapen as they age. We compare our results to that implied by a filtering
story later in the paper.
Fig. 2.—Median price regression and construction costs. The dashed horizontal line represents the $97,974 construction costs (in 2000 dollars) for
a modest-quality, 1,200–square foot single-family home estimated by R. S. Means (2000a). The observation for Honolulu is not plotted for ease of
presentation.
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the margin, the rent paid equals the sum of the benefits associated with
city-specific and location-specific traits.
There is a supply of N lots for each value of . These location-¯a ! a
specific amenities could capture distance to the city center in a con-
ventional monocentric city model or other positive amenities in a richer
urban model such as that of Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002). Each
lot can contain only one house, and each house is identical and can
contain one person.
To capture depreciation, we assume that houses occasionally need to
be rebuilt and that the cost of rebuilding is the same as the cost of new
construction. At the level of the city, this assumption approximates a
more continuous decay process, with lower algebraic costs. If current
rent is a sufficient statistic for predicting future rents (which we assume),
then a lot will be developed or rebuilt when its rent rises above a cutoff
rent . If a lot’s rent falls below , then a home that had been developedr r
will not be rebuilt if it collapses. Declines in population occur when
homes on developed lots whose rents have fallen below collapse.r
For simplicity of exposition, we do not assume a specific stochastic
process for v. Rather, we take the existence of a minimum rent level as
given and initially consider the time path of the city between two periods,
where in the first period and in the second period.vp v vp v  D0 0
To avoid unnecessary complications, we further assume that v has not
risen above the maximum of and at any point and that D isv v  D0 0
small enough in absolute value so that , which ensures thata¯ v  D 1 r0
some houses will be rebuilt if they collapse. We further assume that all
construction and reconstruction decisions are made at the end of the
period after observing .2v  D0
If , then new construction will occur on all lots with amenityD 1 0
levels greater than . Population will rise by in this case. Ifr v  D DN0
, then no new construction will occur, and homes with amenityD ! 0
levels less than that collapse will not be rebuilt. Under ther v  D0
assumption that a proportion d of all homes collapse, the total popu-
lation loss is . While the rent for any given lot will increase ordDN
decrease by D, changes in supply will affect changes in the average rent
in the city. When , new homes will be built. These marginalD 1 0 DN
homes have relatively low amenity levels, and new construction of these
homes will cause average rent in this city to rise by only 0.5D. When
, the city sheds low-amenity units; but since housing supply fallsD ! 0
2 A more complex model that specifies a stochastic process for v as in Dixit and Pindyck’s
(1994) real options framework is available at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/
glaeser/papers.html. While many of those model details differ, no key results are affected.
In particular, a calibration exercise also available on the Web page shows that option value
is not a key driver of development.
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by only , average rent declines by more than 0.5D. In the extremedDN
case in which no homes collapse, the average rent declines by D.
This framework captures the asymmetry that gives us the supply curve
shown in figure 1 and leads to the first proposition (all proofs are in
App. B).
Proposition 1. If D is a random variable that is symmetrically dis-
tributed across cities around a nonnegative number and no other pa-
rameters differ across cities, then the following statements are true:
a. The distribution of city population growth will be skewed in the
sense that the mean is greater than the median.
b. The coefficient estimated when the change in housing price is re-
gressed on the change in population is greater when population is
declining than when population is growing.
c. If , then the derivative of population growth with respect toDp bz
z will be greater when than when . The derivative of pricez 1 0 z ! 0
growth with respect to z will be greater when than whenz ! 0 z 1
.0
The proposition emphasizes that durable housing predicts a skewed
distribution of city growth rates because durability means that cities
decline slowly. Negative shocks will tend to affect prices more than
population, and positive shocks will affect population more than prices.
As a result, the relationship between price growth and population
growth will be concave.
We now include two growth periods to make predictions about per-
sistence and the correlation between housing prices and future urban
dynamics. In this case, we assume that the value of v changes from
to between the second and third periods (withv  D v  D D0 0 2
). Proposition 2 holds if we further assume that v hasCov (D, D )p 02
not risen above the maximum of , , and betweenv v  D v  D D0 0 0 2
the second and third periods and that some houses will be rebuilt even
if they collapse at the end of the third period.
Proposition 2. (a) The derivative of current population growth
with respect to lagged population growth will be greater when lagged
growth is negative than when it is positive. (b) The growth rate of the
city between the second and third periods declines with the share of its
housing stock with rents below .r
Decline is more persistent than growth because durability means that
it can take decades for negative urban shocks to be fully reflected in
urban population levels. While cities are experiencing long, slow de-
clines, they will have an abundance of very cheap housing, the existence
of which will statistically predict future decline.
To examine the interaction between urban decline and the human
capital composition of the city, we now allow for high– and low–human
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capital workers. Low–human capital workers receive wages of W, have
a reservation utility outside of the city of zero, and receive amenity flows
of from living at a particular site in the city. High–human capitalA a
types have wages equal to , have a reservation utility equal to(f 1)W
, and receive utility from amenities equal to . The tasteU (f 1)(a A)
for amenities increases with wages to allow for the possibility that high-
wage people are willing to spend more to obtain things such as better
schools or proximity to work. Everyone still consumes one unit of
housing.
Given these assumptions, low–human capital workers are willing to
pay rent of and high–human capital workers are willing toW A a
pay rent of . High–human capital workers are(1 f)(W A a)U
willing to pay more for homes where . As long as ¯a 1 (U/f) v a 1
, there will be individuals of both types in the city, and(U/f) v 1 r v
we assume that is the case. The share of high-skill workers in the city
will equal . If we then make the same assump-¯ ¯[a v (U/f)]/(a v r)
tions about changes in v as in the initial proposition, proposition 3
follows.
Proposition 3. The proportion of city workers who are high-skilled
rises less with an increase in city population growth than it declines with
a decrease in city population of equal magnitude.
This proposition suggests that we should expect to see declining skill
levels in shrinking cities. The intuition of this proposition is that when
W or A declines, this loss is offset by a decrease in housing prices. But
skilled people particularly value a robust labor market and high amen-
ities, so they leave even though durable housing keeps the overall size
of the population roughly constant.
III. Testing the Implications of the Model
In order to take the implications of the model to the data, we use a
sample of municipal jurisdictions with at least 30,000 residents in 1970.
There are 321 cities with consistent data over the three decades of the
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s in our sample. The core house price and pop-
ulation data are taken from the decennial censuses. All other variables
are described more fully below or in Appendix A.
The first implication of proposition 1 is that population growth should
be skewed, with the mean exceeding the median. Summary statistics for
the 963 decadal population growth rates available between 1970 and
2000 for our 321 cities show a mean growth rate that is 86 percent
greater than the median: 9.1 percent versus 4.9 percent, respectively.
Cities expand much more rapidly than they contract. A similar pattern
holds, with the mean being about twice as large as the median, if we
examine the 642 20-year or the 321 30-year population growth rates of
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TABLE 1
Relationship between Price Changes and Population Changes from
Equation (3) (Part b of Proposition 1)
a1
(1)
a2
(2)
Test for a1 p a2
(3)
2R
(4)
Results from pooled
decadal observations
(N p 963)*
1.80
(.20)
.23
(.05)
F(1, 320) p 45.20
Prob 1 F p .00
.19
Results from three-
decade change (N p
321)†
1.64
(.19)
.09
(.04)
F(1, 320) p 55.16
Prob 1 F p .00
.15
Note.—Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on clustering at the city level. There are 321 city clusters in each
regression. Specifications are estimated using data on cities with at least 30,000 residents in 1970. There are 963
observations on the pooled decadal changes and 321 observations on the 30-year changes. Population and house prices
are obtained from the decennial censuses. Decadal dummy coefficients and intercepts are suppressed throughout. Full
results are available on request. See the text for added detail on the specification.
* Observations pertain to the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.
† Observations pertain to 1970–2000.
our cities. If housing was not durable, we would expect to see much
more of a quantity response in declining cities over longer time spans,
reducing the asymmetry predicted by our model.
The second implication of proposition 1 is that price changes are
more sensitive to population changes when the changes are negative.
While there obviously is no causal linkage implied here, a concave re-
lationship between price appreciation and population growth is an im-
portant testable hypothesis implied by our framework. To investigate
this issue, we regress the percentage growth in housing prices (all prices
are in 2000 dollars) on a transformation of its population growth as
shown in equation (3) below. Population growth is entered in piecewise
linear form to allow for differential effects in expanding versus declining
cities. Thus the POPLOSSi,t variable takes on a value of zero if city i’s
population grew during decade t and equals city i’s actual percentage
decline in population if the city lost population during the relevant
decade. Analogously, the POPGAINi,t variable equals zero if the city lost
population during time period t and equals the actual population
growth rate if the city gained population. Whenever observations are
pooled across decades, we include time dummies (dt) to allow for dif-
ferent intercepts across decades and correct for intertemporal corre-
lation in the error terms associated with multiple observations on the
same city over time. The actual specification estimated is
house price appreciation rate (%) pi,t
a  a # POPLOSS  a # POPGAIN  a # d  e , (3)0 1 i,t 2 i,t 3 t i,t
where ei,t is the standard error term.
The first row of table 1 reports results from a specification that pools
the 963 observations on decadal price and population growth that we
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have for our 321-city sample. Among cities that lost population, the
estimate of a1 indicates an elasticity of price change with respect to
population of 1.8. Thus a one-percentage-point greater rate of popu-
lation decline is associated with nearly a two-percentage-point greater
decline in real house prices over the decade. Among cities that are
gaining population, the elasticity of real house price change with respect
to population change is only 0.23. As the F-test statistic reported in
column 3 shows, these effects are statistically different from one another.
The second row of table 1 indicates that there is no economically
meaningful change in this pattern if the specification is estimated using
longer-run price and population changes between 1970 and 2000. Figure
3 then plots the fitted versus actual price appreciation rates from this
specification, with the observations sorted by population growth.3 While
the prediction of our model is statistically validated, figure 3 illustrates
that there is a small set of cities, primarily along the coast of California,
but also including Seattle and Boulder, with extremely high rates of
growth in real house prices. These places experience positive demand
shocks that drive up prices more than population. In Glaeser, Gyourko,
and Saks (2005), we argue that these places face binding regulatory
constraints on new construction.4
We now examine the final implication of proposition 1: that a specific
positive exogenous shock will have a greater impact on population
growth than a specific negative exogenous shock, and that the negative
exogenous shock will have a greater impact on price appreciation than
a positive exogenous shock. While most shocks to the attractiveness of
urban areas are difficult to measure and are unobservable to us as
econometricians, Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) suggest that the weather
3 The plot of the results from the first specification in table 1 using decadal changes
exhibits much the same pattern, but it is more difficult to read because of the multiple
observations on cities across decades. It should also be noted that the strongly concave
relationship between price changes and population changes in fig. 3 is not dependent
on a few outliers. For example, dropping the initially relatively small cities of Glendale,
AZ, and Mesa, AZ (populations 36,305 and 62,929, respectively), which grew by about 500
percent between 1970 and 2000, does not materially change the results.
4 As this relationship involves two endogenous variables, we also estimated the reverse
regression of population changes on price changes (entered in piecewise linear form so
that separate effects can be estimated for cities experiencing declining vs. rising real house
values). The pooled regression of decadal population growth on decadal real price growth
does yield a larger coefficient when house price appreciation is positive, as our model
predicts, but it is not statistically significantly different from that found when real prices
decline. This specification suffers from three problems. First, there is greater measurement
error of house prices than of population, and that error is in the explanatory variable in
this case. Second, there is no natural break point for price changes at zero, especially
since construction costs are declining in real terms in many markets, including some with
expanding populations (see Gyourko and Saiz 2004). Third, differences in supply elastic-
ities among attractive cities further compromise the reverse regression, as suggested by
the small number of primarily California cities noted above that have extremely high
appreciation of house prices without commensurate population growth.
Fig. 3.—Price appreciation and urban growth
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is one likely observable source of exogenous variation in the demand
for particular locales. The weather is powerfully associated with city
population growth, and the simple correlation between mean January
temperature and growth in our cities has ranged from 0.47 to 0.73 in
the three decades since 1970. Obviously, the weather of cities is not
changing. Rather, rising incomes or factors such as improving air con-
ditioner technology have increased the relative importance of the
weather as an urban amenity. In the context of the model, this could
be formalized by assuming that , where v is the taste for theAp v# X
weather and X is the weather. The shock comes through a change in
v, not a change in X.
Part c of proposition 1 suggests a specification that permits estimation
of separate slopes for negative shocks and positive shocks. As 35.5 per-
cent of our sample of decadal observations on population growth were
negative over the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, we assume that the lowest
35.5 percent of mean January temperatures can be thought of as re-
flecting a negative population shock from the weather. This cutoff im-
plies that all cities with mean January temperatures above 29.1 degrees
Fahrenheit received a positive shock from the weather, and cities with
temperature levels colder than that experienced a negative shock. Our
model does not require this particular choice, but the results are robust
to reasonable alternative cutoff points.
With this transformation, the weather “shock” is entered in piecewise
linear fashion as the COLD and WARM variables in the regressions for
population growth rate and house price appreciation rate described in
equations (4) and (5). Specifically, the variable COLDi takes on a value
of zero if city i’s mean January temperature is greater than 29.1 degrees
and equals the city’s actual mean January temperature otherwise. The
variable WARMi equals zero if city i is colder than 29.1 degrees, on
average, in January and equals the city’s actual mean January temper-
ature otherwise:
population growth rate (%) pi,t
a  a # COLD  a #WARM  a # d  e (4)0 1 i 2 i 3 t i,t
and
house price appreciation rate (%) pi,t
b  b # COLD  b #WARM  b # d  g . (5)0 1 i 2 i 3 t i,t
As before, we allow for different decadal intercepts when pooling
observations across decades. However, robust standard errors based on
clustering at the metropolitan area level, not the city level, are reported
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TABLE 2
Population and Price Growth and the Weather (Part c of Proposition 1)
A. Based on Equation (4)
a1
(1)
a2
(2)
Test for a1 p a2
(3)
2R
(4)
Population growth
results
.0008
(.0020)
.0069
(.0012)
F(1, 261) p 4.79
Prob 1 F p .03
.15
B. Based on Equation (5)
b1
(1)
b2
(2)
Test for b1 p b2
(3)
2R
(4)
House price apprecia-
tion results
.0060
(.0016)
.0023
(.0011)
F(1, 261) p 2.39
Prob 1 F p .12
.11
Note.—Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on clustering at the metropolitan area level. There are 262
metropolitan area clusters in each regression. Specifications are estimated using data on 321 cities with at least 30,000
residents in 1970. There are 963 observations across the three decades of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Population and
house prices are obtained from the decennial censuses. Mean January temperature is a 30-year average that was collected
from the 1992 County and City Data Book. This variable does not vary over time. Decadal dummy coefficients and
intercepts are suppressed throughout. Full results are available on request. See the text for added detail on the
specifications.
here because there is no variation in reported temperature within a
metropolitan area.
The first row of table 2 finds the strong convexity of population
change with respect to weather shocks predicted by part c of proposition
1. Among colder cities, there is no statistically or economically mean-
ingful relationship between being more (or less) cold and population
growth. The result is quite different for warmer places. Among these
cities, being warmer is strongly associated with greater population
growth. The coefficient of 0.0069 implies that an increase of 16 degrees,
which is the interquartile range of mean January temperatures for
warmer cities (from 36 to 52 degrees), is associated with a 10.8 percent
higher decade population growth rate. That is an economically mean-
ingful effect, since the mean decadal increase in population for the
warm cities is 13.5 percent. The F-test results reported in column 3 show
that we can conclude with high confidence that the impacts of these
negative and positive “weather shocks” on population growth are
different.
The next row of table 2 reports results for house price appreciation.
As predicted by part c of proposition 1, there is a concave relationship
between price changes and weather shocks. A negative shock has a
greater impact on price than a positive shock of equal magnitude.
Among colder places, a 10-degree higher temperature is associated with
a 6 percent greater rate of house price growth ( ),0.0060# 10p 0.06
with the same increase among warmer cities being associated with only
a 2.3 percent higher rate of price appreciation ( ).0.0023# 10p 0.023
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TABLE 3
Persistence of Population Decline Based on Equation (6)
(Part a of Proposition 2)
a1
(1)
a2
(2)
a1 p a2
(3)
2R
(4)
Results from pooled
decadal observations
1.001
(.076)
.455
(.039)
F(1, 320) p 29.0
Prob 1 F p .00
.51
Note.—Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on clustering at the city level. There are 321 city clusters. Spec-
ifications are estimated using data on 321 cities with at least 30,000 residents in 1970. In this table, population growth
rates from the 1980s and 1990s are regressed on transformed lags of their respective growth rates and a single decadal
dummy as described in the text. There are 642 decadal observations. All population data were obtained from decennial
censuses. The time dummy coefficient and the intercept are suppressed throughout. All results are available on request.
While this is consistent with our model, the F-test results reported in
column 3 show that the effects are different at only the 88 percent level.
Table 3 addresses part a of proposition 2 that housing durability
should make population decline especially persistent because it can take
many decades for negative shocks to be fully reflected in the size of the
housing stock and population. As in table 1, we allow the estimation of
differential effects of growth versus decline so that the POPLOSS and
POPGAIN variables are as defined as above. Because we are interested
in persistence, current-period population growth is regressed on lagged
growth (where the subscript signifies the decade prior to t), andt 1
we estimate the following specification:
population growth rate (%) pi,t
a  a # POPLOSS  a # POPGAIN  a # d  e . (6)0 1 i,t1 2 i,t1 3 t i,t
The use of lags results in the loss of one decade of data (the 1970s)
and reduces the number of observations to 642 as described in table 3.
The coefficient on past growth when growth was negative is twice that
when past growth was positive. Among cities that declined in the pre-
vious decade, a 1 percent greater population loss is associated with a 1
percent larger population decline this decade. The positive coefficient
of about 0.46 on the lagged value of POPGAIN indicates that there is
some persistence for cities that were growing, too. However, we can
comfortably reject the null hypothesis that these are the same effects
(see col. 3 of table 3). These findings reflect the permanence of decline
among American Rust Belt cities especially. There were 39 U.S. cities
with at least 100,000 people in 1950 that lost population during the
1950s. Of these, 33 declined in the 1960s, 37 declined in the 1970s, 22
declined in the 1980s, and 23 declined in the 1990s.
The final implication of proposition 2 implies that cities with an abun-
dance of cheap housing that is priced below current replacement cost
will not tend to grow as much in the future. This connection is not
causal. Cities with relatively large fractions of housing priced below
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construction cost have suffered significant economic shocks that are the
true drivers of decline.
To measure the fraction of a city’s housing stock that is priced below
the cost of new construction, we use data on self-reported housing values
from the Integrated Public-Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) maintained
by the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota and
compare those prices to the costs of building the physical unit in 1980
and 1990 using information provided by the R. S. Means Company, a
consultant to the home-building industry.5 We focus on single-unit res-
idences that are owner-occupied. The construction cost data are avail-
able per square foot of living area for single-family homes in a wide
variety of cities.6 These data include material costs, labor costs, and
equipment costs for four different qualities of single-unit residences.
No land costs are included. We developed cost series for a one-story,
modest-quality house, with an unfinished basement; the average cost
associated with four possible types of siding and building frame; and
the cost of different sizes in terms of living area (i.e., small or less than
1,550 square feet, medium or between 1,550 and 1,850 square feet, and
large or between 1,850 and 2,500 square feet).
House price and construction cost data were successfully matched for
123 cities in 1980 and 92 cities in 1990. Nationally, 42 percent of single-
unit housing in our cities was valued below the cost of new construction
in 1980. In 1990, the fraction was 31 percent. There is substantial var-
iation across regions. The fraction is very low for homes in western
region cities, but nearly 60 percent of northeastern and midwestern
homes in our sample were valued below replacement cost in 1980. At
the city level, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Honolulu have well under
10 percent of their single-family housing stock priced below construction
cost in 1980 or 1990. In contrast, some of the older, manufacturing cities
such as Flint, Michigan, and Gary, Indiana, have two-thirds or more of
their single-family stocks valued below replacement cost in both
decades.7
5 Two publications (R. S. Means 2000a, 2000b) are particularly relevant for greater detail
on the underlying cost data.
6 Given that construction costs are reported on a per square foot basis, we need to
convert housing values into the same metric. Unfortunately, the census does not report
unit size. Hence, we turn to the American Housing Survey (AHS), which does report the
square footage of living area. We impute unit size in the IPUMS data via the results of a
regression analysis of square footage on a vector of physical traits common to the AHS
and census data sets. See App. A for those details.
7 The data are adjusted to account for the depreciation that occurs on older homes, to
account for general inflation when making comparisons across different years, to account
for the fact that research shows that owners overestimate the value of their homes, and
to account for regional variation in the presence of key house attributes that have a major
impact on value. Appendix A discusses these and other data construction issues in detail.
See our working paper (Glaeser and Gyourko 2001) for the complete listing of each city’s
distribution of house price relative to construction costs.
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TABLE 4
Distribution of House Prices and
Population Growth (Part c of
Proposition 2)
Specification
(1) (2)
a1 .270
(.042)
.267
(.084)
2R .20 .55
Note.—Standard errors (in parentheses) are
based on clustering at the city level. There are 127
city clusters. Specifications are estimated using data
on 215 cities—123 with 1980s data and 92 with
1990s data. Population data are taken from the de-
cennial censuses. House price data are taken from
the IPUMS maintained by the University of Min-
nesota. Construction cost data on single-family
homes are taken from R. S. Means (2000a, 2000b).
Various adjustments to both the numerator and de-
nominator are made in creating the ratio of price
to construction cost in the house q variable. See
the text and App. A for the details. Specification 1
is taken from eq. (7). The local controls included
in specification 2 include the log of median house
price at the beginning of the decade, the percent-
age of the city housing stock at the beginning of
the decade composed of single-unit dwellings, cen-
sus region dummies, the log of city population at
the beginning of the decade, the city’s family pov-
erty rate at the beginning of the decade, and 30-
year averages for January temperature, July tem-
perature, and annual rainfall. The time dummy
coefficient and the intercept are suppressed
throughout. All results are available on request.
This ratio of market value to replacement cost is akin to a Tobin’s q-
value for a city’s housing stock. However, Tobin’s q increases with the
premium over replacement cost, whereas our variable rises in value the
greater the fraction of the housing stock priced below cost. In equation
(7), which describes a regression of decadal city population growth on
this measure of market value to replacement cost at the beginning of
the decade, this variable is labeled house qi,t_, where the minus sign
in front indicates that a higher value is associated with more, not fewer,
units being valued below physical construction costs. The t_ subscript
indicates that the value is taken from the beginning of the relevant
decade:
population growth rate (%) pi,t
a  a #house q  a # d  e . (7)0 1 i,t_ 2 t i,t
After we pool observations across the two available decades of con-
struction cost data, column 1 of table 4 reports that our estimate of a1
is 0.27. This highly statistically significant result (standard error of
0.042) implies that for every 10 percent more of the housing stock that
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is priced below the cost of new construction, the growth rate of pop-
ulation is reduced by 2.7 percent. This is over half the median decadal
growth rate of 4.9 percent and almost one-third of the 9.1 percent mean
decadal rate of population growth among our 321 cities. Moreover, the
mean value of house q is 37.3 percent, with a standard deviation of
25.3 percent, so that a one-standard-deviation increase in the fraction
of the city housing stock that is priced below physical construction costs
is associated with almost a 7 percent lower population growth rate. The
distribution of house prices strongly predicts future population growth.
A reasonable criticism of any regression involving housing prices and
urban dynamics is that these correlations exist only because housing
prices reflect expectations about future housing price growth, which is
itself a function of future urban growth. We address this concern in two
ways. First, we have examined the correlation between the share of the
city’s housing stock that is priced below the cost of new construction at
the beginning of a decade and the growth of real house prices over the
ensuing 10 years. If the expectations hypothesis is relevant here, we
would expect this relationship to be negative, but it is in fact slightly
positive. Second, as the current median housing price should reflect at
least some of the expectations about future changes in housing prices,
controlling for house price should help mitigate the problem. When
house price at the beginning of the decade is included with a host of
other controls, the coefficient on the fraction of the stock priced below
construction costs is essentially unchanged at 0.267, as reported in
column 2 of table 4.
We close this section by addressing the connection between human
capital and urban decline described in proposition 3. Declining cities
both are poor and have high levels of less well-educated workers. Glaeser,
Kahn, and Rappaport (2000) argue that the tendency of the poor to
live close to city centers is driven by a desire to economize on transport
costs, especially car ownership. Their work helps explain patterns of
wealth and poverty across jurisdictions within a metropolitan area, but
it cannot account for the variation across metropolitan areas because
the costs of car ownership, especially for poorer or low-skill households,
probably do not differ all that much across growing versus declining
cities.
In our empirical analysis of whether cheap, durable housing can ac-
count for the relationship between urban decline and falling human
capital levels, we use a conventional measure of education, the share
of college graduates in the city’s adult population (defined as those at
least 25 years of age), to reflect the skill level of the area. In the re-
gression specifications below, the variable DCOLi,t represents the change
in city i’s share of college graduates over decade t. We begin by docu-
menting that there is, in fact, a significantly higher rate of loss of college
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TABLE 5
Human Capital, Cheap Housing, and Urban Decline (Proposition 3)
Specification
(1) (2) (3)
a1 8.28
(1.86)
.30
(1.80)
8.35
(2.03)
a2 .83
(.58)
.25
(.56)
1.99
(.61)
F-tests F(1, 320) p 12.75
Prob 1 F p .00
F(1, 320) p .08
Prob 1 F p .78
F(1, 261) p 9.33
Prob 1 F p .00
2R .15 .26 .25
Note.—Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on clustering at the city level in the first two specifications and
at the metropolitan area level in the third specification. There are 321 city clusters and 262 metropolitan area clusters.
Clustering by metropolitan area occurs when weather-related variables are included in the specification. Specifications
are estimated using data on 321 cities with at least 30,000 residents in 1970. Specification 1 is based on eq. (8).
Specification 2 adds median house price (at the end of each decade) to the basic model in eq. (8). Specification 3
includes city population; the family poverty rate; the change in Hispanic population share; weather conditions as
reflected in mean January temperature, mean July temperature, and average annual rainfall; and region dummies.
College graduate shares and the family poverty rate were obtained from various issues of the County and City Data
Book and Housing and Urban Development’s State of the Cities data system. Population, house prices, and Hispanic
share were obtained from the decennial censuses. All weather variables represent 30-year averages that were collected
from the County and City Data Book. Time dummy coefficients and the intercept are suppressed throughout. All
results are available on request.
graduates the greater the rate of population loss among declining cities.
As before, we use a transformation of population growth to permit
estimation of different effects for expanding versus shrinking cities so
that the POPLOSSi,t and POPGAINi,t variables are as defined above.
Because data availability allows us to pool observations across all three
decades in our sample, the usual time dummies are included, with robust
standard errors estimated on the basis of clustering by city. Column 1
of table 5 reports the results of estimating equation (8):
DCOL p a  a # POPLOSS  a # POPGAINi,t 0 1 i,t 2 i,t
 a # d  e . (8)3 t i,t
Among cities losing residents, a greater rate of loss is associated with
a significant drop in population share of the highly educated; there is
no significant correlation between the extent of population growth and
the share of college-educated among growing cities. The F-test results
also show that we can be sure that these effects are, in fact, different.
Given the units of observation, the estimated a1 coefficient of 8.28 from
column 1 implies that a 10 percent greater rate of population decline
over a decade is associated with a 0.83-percentage-point lower share of
college graduates. There is just over a three-percentage-point gap be-
tween the average share of college graduates in expanding versus de-
clining cities in our sample (16.9 percent among cities that were losing
population in a given decade vs. 20.2 percent for those gaining resi-
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dents), so this estimated impact can account for a significant fraction
of the average difference we see in this local attribute.
If the model underlying proposition 3 is correct and cheap housing
is relatively more attractive to those with lower wages (and, presumably,
less skill), then controlling for the distribution of house prices at the
end of the time period should weaken or eliminate the correlation
pattern just identified. Column 2 of table 5 reports results in which the
log of median house price at the end of each decade is added to the
basic regression in equation (8). Simply controlling for one measure of
central tendency of city house prices eliminates the relationship between
the rate of population loss and the share of college graduates among
declining cities. The relevant F-test statistics comparing the two effects
show that we cannot reject the null that there is no difference in effects
across growing versus declining cities once we control for end-of-period
house prices.
If other local traits generated the same result, that would cast doubt
on our contention that it is cheap housing that attracts or retains the
poor in declining cities. We could not find any other variable that could
do so. The findings in column 3 of table 5 report the results after
including a host of other local controls (besides house prices), including
the log of city population, the family poverty rate, weather conditions,
region dummies, and changes in Hispanic population shares. These
variables have very little impact on the relationship between decline and
skill composition of the residents, and the specification still is estimated
precisely enough that we can reject the null that there are no differences
in impacts across the two types of cities. In sum, the housing price
control, and no other local variable, has the effect of eliminating the
connection between human capital and urban decline.8
IV. Alternative Explanations: Is the “Bricks and Mortar”
Perspective on Urban Decline Robust?
In this section, we consider alternative explanations for our findings,
including long-lived physical plant or infrastructure, immobile people,
and filtering in the housing market. Some of these hypotheses are po-
tentially complementary with our durable housing framework. In all
8 We repeated the exercise using the change in the share of non–high school graduates
and found that controlling for the distribution of house prices also can account for the
correlation between this measure of human capital and city growth. In addition, we ex-
perimented with two income-based measures of human capital—median family income
and the poverty rate—to similar effect. Admittedly, these two variables are problematic
because if rising population levels are caused by rising labor demand, then we should
expect to see a positive relationship even if the housing factors that drive our model are
not important. Nonetheless, these variables may be better measures of human capital than
educational degrees, so they were examined for robustness.
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cases, we attempt to discern which is more consistent with the facts
describing urban decline.
A. Durable Plant and Infrastructure
Declining cities might endure because they have a durable production
infrastructure or long-lived agglomerations of firms (as in Krugman
[1991a, 1991b]), not just durable homes. These explanations are not
mutually exclusive, since both physical plant and housing could be em-
pirically relevant. To investigate this possibility, we construct a measure
of Tobin’s q for firms headquartered in our sample of cities and use it
to augment the specification estimated in equation (7), which showed
that cities with a low housing q (i.e., those with a large fraction of their
owner-occupied stocks valued below replacement cost) have much less
future growth. By including a measure of corporate q for the city (de-
scribed more fully below), we can see whether the data prefer it or
house q as a predictor of future growth.9
If U.S. Steel’s plants are the primary reason that many people still
live in Gary, then irreversible industrial investment suggests that Tobin’s
q for such a firm located in the city should forecast future growth.
Tobin’s q was created for every publicly traded firm listed in the Com-
pustat files in 1980 and 1990, with q calculated as the ratio of the market
value of firm assets divided by the book value of assets as in Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2003). While this variable is widely used in financial
economics research, it is not straightforward to match it to specific cities
in our urban context. Tobin’s q is a firm-level measure, and companies
typically have assets in more than one jurisdiction. Compustat does
identify the county (not the city) in which the company is headquar-
tered, and we use that to match firms to cities. The corporate q for a
city is the market value–weighted average of individual company q’s
located in the county in which the relevant central city is located. In
the regression results reported below, we label this variable corporate
q.
We are able to match a firm-based q to 206 of the 215 city-year pairs
used in the house q regression reported in table 4.10 The average number
of firms making up a city’s corporate q is 23, with a standard deviation
of 39. The range of this number is wide, varying from one in a handful
of places (e.g., Beaumont, TX; Corpus Christi, TX; Erie, PA; Lorain,
9 We are grateful to the editor, John Cochrane, for suggesting this approach and to
Andrew Metrick for helping with the Compustat data.
10 The inability to match arises if Compustat does not report any firms headquartered
in the home counties of one of our cities. They tend to be less populous locales and are
spread across the country (e.g., they are in California, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, and Texas).
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OH; Mobile, AL; South Bend, IN; Springfield, MA; and Topeka, KS) to
well over 200 in the nation’s major cities (e.g., Chicago, Los Angeles,
and New York). We report results without correcting for the number of
firms in the city’s corporate q. There are many reasons why weighting
by the number of firms is not necessarily better. Empirically, we find
that weighting by firms or market capitalization does not increase the
estimated importance of corporate q in our regressions (and weighting
by the number of firms is always associated with a smaller impact).11
The average city-level corporate q is 1.51, with a standard deviation
of 0.82. The median is 1.26. The lowest corporate q for any city is 0.63,
with the maximum just below five. Cities with relatively large fractions
of their owner-occupied housing stocks priced below construction cost
tend to have a low value of corporate q. Because a high value forhouse
q reflects a larger share of housing valued below replacement cost, this
means that the two variables are negatively correlated. The simple cor-
relation between the share of a city’s housing priced below physical
replacement cost and the q of its local companies is 0.24. That cor-
relation is statistically significant and does not vary much across the two
decades for which we have data.
This raises the possibility that a city’s corporate q, not its house q,
really is behind the relationship identified above in table 4. To get at
this issue, we begin by reestimating equation (7) on the slightly reduced
number of observations for which we have both house q and corporate
q measures. As column 1 of table 6 shows, the results are virtually un-
changed, with a 10 percent higher share of the local housing stock that
is priced below construction costs at the beginning of the decade still
associated with about 2.7 percent lower population growth over the
decade.
The second regression reported in table 6 estimates equation (9),
which identifies the correlation between beginning-of-period corporate
q and population growth:
population growth rate (%) p a  a # corporate qi,t 0 1 i,t_
 a # d  e . (9)2 t i,t
Corporate q predicts population growth when we do not control for
house q.
The third regression reported in table 6 includes both house q and
11 Measurement error in the ratio of market to replacement value of a city’s corporate
assets need not decline with the number of firms located in a place. Corporate q based
on the one company headquartered in Beaumont, TX, could more accurately describe
the state of that city’s fixed plant than the analogous value for Philadelphia, which is based
on 32 companies. Not only is the local economy in Philadelphia more complex, but its
firms in the Compustat files sometimes are global entities whose q-values are influenced
by assets far from Philadelphia.
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TABLE 6
House q, Corporate q, and City Population Growth from Equations
(7) and (9)
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
House q .266
(.044)
.238
(.043)
.242
(.043)
Corporate q .051
(.019)
.033
(.020)
Corporate q ! 1 .104
(.128)
Corporate q 1 1 .037
(.021)
Observations 206 206 206 206
2R .19 .08 .22 .23
Note.—Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on clustering at the city level. There are 124 city clusters.
Specifications are estimated using data on 206 cities with nonmissing house q and corporate q data in 1980 and
1990. Population data are taken from the decennial censuses. See the note to table 4 for data sources on the
construction of the house q variable. The corporate q variable is constructed as the market capitalization–
weighted average of firm q’s located in the home county of the relevant city. Firm q is constructed as in Gompers
et al. (2003). See the text for more details. The time dummy coefficient and the intercept are suppressed
throughout. All results are available on request.
corporate q. The coefficient on the ratio of corporate market to book
value declines by over one-third and is no longer significant at standard
confidence levels. The coefficient on the house q control remains sta-
tistically significant and declines only slightly in size. In economic terms,
the coefficient on the city’s corporate q implies a standardized marginal
effect that is not even half as large as that for house q.12 In column 4
of table 6, we report a specification in which corporate q is entered in
piecewise linear form to allow estimation of separate effects depending
on whether the city’s corporate q is below or above one. Having a cor-
porate q below one is associated with lower population growth, having
a corporate q above one is associated with higher population growth,
and the estimated effect of corporate is significant at the 10 percentq 1 1
level.13 The impact of house q is virtually unchanged.
While table 6 provides suggestive evidence that the durability of pro-
ductive capital matters, there is no evidence that our house q variable
was spuriously reflecting the impact of installed corporate capital. That
said, this latter measure is noisy and always has the expected sign in
12 The standard deviation of the fraction of city housing value below replacement cost
is 0.25, and that for corporate q is 0.82. Given the two regression coefficients, the stan-
dardized marginal effect for house q is 0.06 ( ) and that for corporate q∼ .25#0.24
is 0.027 ( ).∼ 0.82# 0.033
13 Changing the breakpoint to the median (1.26) or similar values does not affect the
results in any material way. The coefficients always have the right sign, with a high corporate
q predicting higher population growth at close to standard confidence levels, and the
house q variable retaining its economic and statistical significance.
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our regressions, so we do not interpret table 6 as concluding that there
is nothing to the durable (nonhousing) infrastructure story.
Other data and implications of the Rosen-Roback model also support
the primacy of durable housing in accounting for the nature of urban
decline. If it were true that people remained in declining cities primarily
because of a productive installed capital base or a valuable agglomer-
ation of firms, then we should see signs of that in the labor market. For
example, physical capital in the production sector should keep wages
relatively high and unemployment relatively low. On the other hand, if
declining cities endure primarily because of durable housing, then
wages should be low and offset by low housing costs.
Recent census data show that wages are about 10 percent higher in
the fastest-growing cities relative to the slowest-growing cities. The un-
employment rate is about 40 percent higher in the slowest-growing cities,
so layoff risk does not appear to be lower in declining cities, such as
Gary, Detroit, and St. Louis, that have abundant installed manufacturing
plant. Not only is there no evidence that remaining residents are com-
pensated via the labor market, but the data are clear that housing is
cheap in declining cities. Mean prices for a given size, owner-occupied
home (i.e., those with three bedrooms) are about 50 percent lower in
declining cities according to recent censuses. And, there is a similar gap
in apartment rents. Thus the data are more consistent with cheap hous-
ing keeping people in declining areas, not the labor market benefits
that would be associated with a productive fixed infrastructure or val-
uable agglomeration of firms.
B. Immobile People
A second alternative hypothesis is that declining cities endure because
their residents just do not move (for whatever reason) after they arrived
to take advantage of some initial agglomeration. In other words, it could
be the people, not the homes, that create the “stickiness” generating
the important asymmetries in our model. To investigate this possibility,
we collected mobility data from the census. Specifically, we began by
calculating in-migration rates for 111 cities using the 1980 census
PUMS.14 Declining cities have less in-migration than growing cities: the
14 The 1980 data are especially well suited to our needs. No within-city moves are included
in our in-migration figures using this sample. Moves within a county are included if the
given county includes part of the suburbs of the city. Because the PUMS samples require
the use of weights and some observations inevitably contain missing data, we checked the
quality of our calculations by comparing the results for the few places in which the city
and county are coterminus (e.g., Philadelphia, St. Louis, etc.) with the county-level in-
migration rates reported at the county level by the Bureau of the Census in Study no.
8471 of the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. The findings
were nearly identical in all cases.
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correlation between the in-migration rate and log population change
is 0.60. However, in-migration rates are still high even in declining cities.
For example, 8.8 percent of Philadelphia’s 1980 population, or almost
300,000 residents, had moved into the city over the previous five years.
Every city in our sample had five-year in-migration rates that were at
least 6 percent of total population, and all but three had in-migration
rates in excess of 8 percent. Extrapolating these numbers over the dec-
ade implies that over 15 percent of the city’s residents had moved in
during the last 10 years—even in the places experiencing the greatest
net decline in population. If these inflows had stopped, population
decline would have more than doubled in most declining cities. Thus
the data suggest that Americans are fairly mobile. It is the homes that
are fixed.
C. Filtering in the Housing Market
A third alternative hypothesis for some of our findings is the filtering
of housing. In filtering models, older houses are cheap because they
are old, with Muth (1973) providing the classic statement on this frame-
work. In our model, older houses are cheap primarily because demand
for their location has collapsed. Using the 1999 national file of the AHS,
we categorized homes of a given quality (defined by the characteristics
of being single-family, owner-occupied, and with from two to four bed-
rooms) as new or old depending on whether they had been built within
the last 10 years or at least 40 years ago. There is much truth to the
filtering story since, in most places, old housing certainly is cheaper
than new housing. However, a more detailed examination finds that the
really important determinant of price is location, not age.
In declining cities such as Philadelphia and Detroit, old homes are
indeed cheap, but the prices of new homes are also quite low. In Phil-
adelphia’s case, the median value of homes built within the past 10 years
was $75,000 versus $60,000 for those at least four decades old. In Detroit,
the median value of the newer homes is actually slightly below that of
the older homes, at $62,500 versus $70,000. In contrast, in expensive
places, the prices of old and new homes are all quite high, and there
is little or no difference based on age in these places. In Los Angeles,
the median new and old home was worth $200,000 according to the
1999 AHS. In San Francisco, the median older home was slightly more
expensive than the median newer homes, at $350,000 versus $300,000.
Filtering of housing down the quality spectrum occurs, but the data
emphasize that in declining cities, housing is both cheap and old be-
cause demand has collapsed, not because old housing is cheap per se.
Even new housing is relatively inexpensive in Philadelphia and Detroit,
and even old housing in San Francisco is quite expensive.
370 journal of political economy
V. Conclusion
Most of the urban growth literature ignores the physical nature of cities.
While the durability of housing may not be a crucial element of urban
dynamics for growing cities, it is essential for understanding the nature
of urban decline, and many of our major cities are in decline. The
supply side of the housing market helps explain why cities decline so
slowly even though they can grow at very fast rates. Durable housing
can also explain the striking persistence of urban decline.
Durable housing predicts that exogenous shocks lead to different
asymmetric responses of population and house prices. Negative shocks
have a relatively small impact on population growth, especially among
declining cities, since the durability of housing leads to declines in
demand being reflected more in prices than in people. Conversely, the
ability to build means that positive shocks have a greater impact on
growth because new supply dampens the effect on prices. Both asym-
metries are borne out in the data. Another implication of durable hous-
ing is that the distribution of house prices is an excellent predictor of
future population growth. The data show that growth is quite rare in
cities with large fractions of their housing stock valued below the cost
of new construction.
Finally, the model helps explain why cities in greater decline tend to
have lower levels of human capital, since cheap housing is relatively
more attractive to the poor. The tendency of declining cities to dispro-
portionately attract the poor is particularly important if concentrations
of poverty further deter growth. If low levels of human capital then
create negative externalities or result in lower levels of innovation, this
becomes particularly troubling because a self-reinforcing process can
result in which an initial decline causes concentrated poverty, which
then pushes the city further downward (e.g., Glaeser, Scheinkman, and
Shleifer 1995; Cullen and Levitt 1999). However, that issue is for future
research.
Appendix A
Construction of the House Value/Construction Cost Ratio
A number of adjustments are made to the underlying house price data in the
comparison of prices to construction costs. They include imputation of the
square footage of living area for observations from the IPUMS for the 1980 and
1990 census years. Following that, we make three adjustments to the house price
data to account for the depreciation that occurs on older homes, to account
for general inflation when comparing across years, and to account for the fact
that research shows that owners tend to overestimate the value of their homes.
Finally, we make an adjustment to construction costs in order to account for
the wide regional variation in the presence of basements. The remainder of this
appendix provides the details.
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First, the square footage of living area must be imputed for each observation
in 1980 and 1990 from the IPUMS. Because the AHS contains square footage
information, we begin by estimating square footage in that data set, using hous-
ing traits that are common to the AHS and IPUMS data. This set includes the
age of the building (AGE and its square), whether there is a full kitchen (KIT-
FULL), the number of bedrooms (BEDROOMS), the number of bathrooms
(BATHROOMS), the number of other rooms (OTHROOMS), a dummy variable
for the presence of central air conditioning (AIRCON), controls for the type
of home heating system (HEAT, with controls for the following types: gas, oil,
electric, and no heat), a dummy variable for detached housing unit status (DE-
TACHED), dummy variables for each metropolitan area (MSA), and dummy
variables for the U.S. census regions (REGION).
Data frequently were missing for the presence of air conditioning (AIRCON)
and the number of other rooms (OTHROOMS). So as not to substantially reduce
the number of available observations, we coded in the mean for these variables
when the true value was missing. Special dummies were included in the speci-
fication estimated to provide separate effects of the true versus assigned data.
Thus the linear specification estimated has the following form:
2SQUARE FOOTAGE p f {AGE , AGE , BEDROOMS , BATHROOMS ,i i i i i
KITFULL , OTHROOMS , AIRCON ,i i i
HEAT, DETACHED , MSA , REGION },i i i i
where the subscript i indexes the house observations, and separate regressions
are run using the 1985 and 1989 AHS data. Our samples include only single-
unit, owned residences in central cities and those without extreme square foot-
age values (i.e., we deleted observations with less than 500 square feet and more
than 5,000 square feet of living area [4,000 square feet was the top code in the
1989 survey]). The overall fits are reasonably good, with the adjusted ’s being2R
0.391 in the 1985 data and 0.306 in the 1989 data. The 1985 coefficients are
then used to impute the square footage of the observations from the 1980
IPUMS, and the 1989 coefficients are used analogously for the 1990 IPUMS
sample.
Once house value is put into price per square foot form, it can be compared
to the construction cost per square foot data from the R. S. Means Company.
However, we make other adjustments before making that comparison. One ad-
justment takes into account the fact that research shows that owners tend to
overestimate the value of their homes. Following the survey and recent esti-
mation by Goodman and Ittner (1992), we presume that owners typically over-
value their homes by 6 percent.
A second, and empirically more important, adjustment takes into account the
fact that the vast majority of our homes are not new and have experienced real
depreciation. Depreciation factors are estimated using the AHS and then applied
to the IPUMS data. More specifically, we regress house value per square foot
(scaled down by the Goodman and Ittner [1992] correction) in the relevant
year (1985 or 1989) on a series of age controls and metropolitan area dummies.
The age data are given in interval form so that we can tell whether a house is
0–5 years old, 6–10 years old, 11–25 years old, 25–36 years old, and more than
45 years old. Because slightly different intervals are reported in the AHS and
IPUMS, we experimented with transformations based on each survey’s intervals.
The different matching produces very similar results. The coefficients on the
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age controls are each negative as expected and represent the extent to which
houses of different ages have depreciated in value on a per square foot basis.
Because the regressions use nominal data, we make a further adjustment for
the fact that general price inflation occurred between 1980–85 and 1989–90.
In the case of applying the 1985 results to the 1980 IPUMS data, we scale down
the implied depreciation factor by the percentage change in the rental cost
component of the consumer price index between 1980 and 1985. In the case
of applying the 1989 results to the 1990 IPUMS observations, we scale up the
implied depreciation factor in an analogous fashion.
The depreciation factors themselves are relatively large. After we make the
inflation and Goodman-Ittner correction, the results for 1980 suggest that a
house that was 6–11 years old was worth $3.17 per square foot less than a new
home. Very old homes (i.e., 46 years) were estimated to be worth $11.94 per
square foot less than a new home that year.
Finally, we make an adjustment for the fact that there is substantial regional
and cross-metropolitan area variation in the presence of basements. Having a
basement adds materially to construction costs according to the Means data.
Units with unfinished basements have about 10 percent higher construction
costs depending on the size of the unit. Units with finished basements have up
to 30 percent higher construction costs, again depending on the size of the
unit. Our procedure effectively assumes that units with a basement in the AHS
have unfinished basements, so that we underestimate construction costs for units
with finished basements. Unfortunately, the IPUMS data in 1980 and 1990 do
not report whether the housing units have a basement. However, using the AHS
data, we can calculate the probability that a housing unit in a specific U.S. census
division has a basement. The divisional differences are extremely large, ranging
from 1.3 percent in the West South Central census division to 94.9 percent in
the Middle Atlantic census division. Thus, in the West South Central census
division, we assume that each unit has 0.013 basement and that each unit in
the Middle Atlantic division has 0.949 basement. Because of the very large gross
differences in the propensity to have basements, this adjustment almost certainly
reduces measurement error relative to assuming that all units have basements
or that none have basements.
After these adjustments, house value “as if new” is then compared to con-
struction costs to produce the distributions discussed in the text.
Appendix B
Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
Part a: If D is symmetrically distributed around with cumulative distributionˆD ≥ 0
, then the mean growth rate is , which is greater0ˆF(D) ND (1 d)DdF(D)∫Dp
than the median growth rate, .ˆND
Part b: When D is positive, the change in price always equals times1/(2N )
the change in quantity, so the estimated regression coefficient will equal
. When D is negative, the change in population is , and the change1/(2N ) dDN
in rent is
¯D (1 d)(a r v )01 ,[ ]¯2 a r v  dD0
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so the estimated regression coefficient equals
¯(1 d)(a r v )02D 1 dF(D)( [ ]a¯ r v  dD!D 0 0
¯(1 d)(a r v )0 D 1 dF(D) D { [ ] } )a¯ r v  dD!D 0 0
2 2 2dN D dF(D)D , { [ ]}
!D 0
where . This is less than as long asD p D 7 dF(D) 1/(2N )∫ !D 0
D(DD ) dF(D) 1 0, a¯ r v  dD!D 0 0
which must be true because , and is de-¯D(DD )dF(D) 1 0 a r v  dD∫ !D 0  0
creasing in the absolute value of D.
Part c: When z is positive, the growth in population equals , so the derivativeNbz
of growth with respect to z equals . When z is negative, population changeNb
equals , so the derivative of growth with respect to z will equal . WhendNbz dNb
z is positive, the change in rents equals , so the derivative of the change0.5bz
in rents with respect to z will equal . When z is negative, the change in rents0.5b
will equal
¯(1 d)(a r v )00.5bz 1[ ]a¯ r v  dbz0
and the derivative with respect to z will equal
¯ ¯(1 d)(a r v ) dbz(1 d)(a r v )0 00.5b 1  1 0.5b.2[ ]¯ ¯a r v  dbz (a r v  dbz)0 0
Proof of Proposition 2
Part a: For cities that grew during the first time period, next-period growth is
orthogonal to lagged growth, so the estimated coefficient will be zero. If lagged
growth is negative, then growth in the next period equals if[d(1 d)D dD ]N2
, if , and ifD ! 0 [d(1 d)(DD ) dD ]N D 1 D 1 0 [(1 d)DD ]N D 12 2 2 2 2 2
. Differentiation then tells us that expected growth is increasing in D or first-D
period growth.
Part b: The share of housing with rents below in the second period equalsr
, which is a monotonically negative function of D. If¯D(1 d)/(a v  r dD)0
S is the share with rents below , then . And if¯r DpS(a v  r)/[1 (1 S)d]0
expected growth is rising with D, then it is falling with S.
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Proof of Proposition 3
If the city population grows an amount x because of an increase in either W or
A, then the share of high-skilled workers in the city will increase from ¯[a
to . The¯ ¯ ¯v  (U/f)]/(a v  r) [a v  (x/N ) (U/f)]/[a v  (x/N ) r]0 0 0 0
change in the share of skilled workers in the city will equal
(x/N )[(U/f) r]
.
¯ ¯[a v  (x/N ) r](a v  r)0 0
If the city population declines by an amount x, then the share of high-skilled
workers in the city will decline from to¯ ¯ ¯[a v  (U/f)]/(a v  r) [a v 0 0 0
, which implies a change in the number of¯(x/dN ) (U/f)]/[a v  (x/N ) r]0
skilled workers equal to
(x/N )[(U/f) r] (1 d)x
 ,
¯ ¯ ¯[a v  (x/N ) r](a v  r) dN[a v  (x/N ) r]0 0 0
which is obviously larger in absolute value than
(x/N )[(U/f) r]
.
¯ ¯[a v  (x/N ) r](a v  r)0 0
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